Law of Attraction Arguments, Part 1: “Metaphysical Pseudoscience”

Titlepic: Law of Attraction Arguments, Part 1: 'Metaphysical Pseudoscience'.

Here I discuss the argument that Law of Attraction is just some metaphysical pseudoscience. Does this argument really work to discredit Law of Attraction?

KEYWORDS: arguments, law of attraction, metaphysics, philosophy, pseudoscience, psychology.

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Note: This article is part of a series on arguments against the Law of Attraction. All articles in this series are available from the overview page called “Law of Attraction: Is It Real?

Today I will be discussing an argument that was originally published in an article on the Psychology Today website called “The Truth About the Law of Attraction“, written by Neil Farber.

In that article he presents 14 different arguments against the Law of Attraction, and the first one is labeled “metaphysical pseudoscience”.

So I thought it would be an interesting exercise to see if he really has a point. In other words, is he successful in his attempt to discredit the Law of Attraction? Is Law of Attraction nothing but some metaphysical nonsense or pseudoscience? Let’s find out!

PART 1: THE ARGUMENT

Here is how Farber starts his argument on Law of Attraction as “metaphysical pseudoscience”:

“LOA proponents claim that it is based on scientific theory. It is at best, metaphysical pseudoscience with conclusions based on erroneous, unfounded, and often incorrect assumptions.”

And then Farber goes on to give multiple examples of ideas that supposedly come from proponents of some version of the Law of Attraction.

So his examples include “Electrons have positive charges”, “Thinking burns up brain matter” and “Higher altitudes have more oxygen…”, etc.

Argument 1: “Metaphysical Pseudoscience”

Now let me try to reconstruct what his argument really is (since his own text is quite informal). Here is what I think he is saying:

P1.Some authors say that the Law of Attraction is based on scientific theory.

P2.But as we can see in the examples, many authors on the Law of Attraction make obviously non-scientific claims.

P3.So the Law of Attraction is metaphysical pseudoscience.

PART 2: MY RESPONSE

In this part I will analyze Argument 1 (“Metaphysical Pseudoscience”) to see if it makes sense, and to figure out if it is actually a philosophically valid and sound argument.

Proposition P1: Based on Scientific Theory

In this section I am discussing proposition P1 in Argument 1, which goes like this:

P1.Some authors say that the Law of Attraction is based on scientific theory.

Farber is right. It is true that some authors and practitioners of Law of Attraction are claiming that it is based on science, or that it is “scientific” in some sense.

For example, it not uncommon to hear claims that quantum physics somehow or other is involved, or that such a connection should be interpreted as “proof” or an “indication” that the Law of Attraction is a valid principle.

But these claims are typically made by people who are proponents of the many non-authorized versions of the Law of Attraction. The authors of the authorized versions of the Law of Attraction, however, would never claim such things, and never have.

So the important thing to point out here is that there is not just one version of Law of Attraction, but many. Thus, in order to succeed with the Law of Attraction, you need to pick an authorized version, and avoid the non-authorized ones.

And the question can also be raised: How is this (i.e., claiming that a theory is scientific), at all, a real problem? Sure, claiming that something is scientific when it isn’t might of course undermine the authority of those who are saying such things. But so what? What does that have to do with the law itself? If I have the formula of the law, and I call it “scientific” or “unscientific” or “green cheese”, what does it matter? If the formula works, then it is true.

Proposition P2: Non-Scientific Claims

So here I am commenting on proposition P2 in Argument 1, which goes like this:

P2.But as we can see in the examples, many authors on the Law of Attraction make obviously non-scientific claims.

Farber might be right. If the many examples that he has provided really are from authors of the Law of Attraction, then he may have a point.

But that, of course, remains to be seen. For he has not provided any evidence to support his examples. None of the ten “scientific truths” that he is labeling as “incorrect scientific information” come with any information about their origins: there is no book title, no author, no publisher, no edition, and no page numbers mentioned for any of them. Therefore, in its current reincarnation, we cannot conclude that P2 is true.

And if we cannot conclude that P2 is true, then his whole argument falls apart. Sure, it may be valid in a structural sense (it’s not really stringently deductive, but I’ll let that pass). But since one of the premises is not true, it messes up everything.

So the argument as a whole is unsound, and can therefore technically be dismissed, according to formal philosophical and scientific procedure. No-one would have received their Ph.D. in any accredited and reputable academic institution with such an argument in their dissertation.

In other words, he has not succeeded in making a sound argument. And therefore there is nothing else to discuss.

Thus, because of this blunder, he has proven absolutely nothing about the Law of Attraction. It can still be a 100% correct law of the universe.

Proposition P2: What If?

But in order to give a fellow scholar the benefit of a doubt, let us imagine he had supplied the right references (i.e. all ten of them), in a formal scientific manner, and that those ten snippets of ideas were factually published by various Law of Attraction authors. What would we say in such a situation?

First of all, one thing to bear in mind is that non-scientific theories need not be false just because the scientific community does not currently accept them. This means that there actually are two types of non-scientific theories: those that are false, and those that are true. Science would, of course, not currently accept the latter as true, but that is just because science doesn’t know the whole truth about the world.

Thus, making non-scientific claims may very well amount to a true description of the factual state of things in the universe (whether or not contemporaneous science accepts it as true).

Another thing to consider is this. The non-scientific claims that Farber is referring to typically are made by a certain group of people. There are non-authorized versions of the Law of Attraction, and there are authorized ones. The non-scientific claims are typically made by those representing the non-authorized versions of the Law of Attraction. So how can they affect the validity of the authorized version of Law of Attraction?

Thought Experiment: Law of Gravitation

To illustrate this, let’s say that a group of crazy fringe scientists (whether originally from an Ivy League school or not) suddenly claim that the law of gravitation is “unscientific”. So they write various books, describing it differently, and perhaps are also changing Newton’s formula to their liking. [note 1]

But what problem would that be for the credibility of the real law of gravitation? It is already firmly established and documented in the authorized works published by Harvard University Press and Oxford University Press, etc., all of which are easily found in any major research library on the planet.

Similarly, what problem is there for the authorized version of the Law of Attraction that some amateurs and self-appointed “experts” are making unscientific claims about their non-authorized version of Law of Attraction in their own publications? The authorized versions of the Law of Attraction are still in print, available both in the stacks at Harvard University and at the Bodleian at Oxford, and in millions of homes of emotionally intelligent people.

Proposition P3: Metaphysical Psudoscience

In the following I am commenting on proposition P3 in Argument 1, which goes like this:

P3.So the Law of Attraction is metaphysical pseudoscience.

As we saw from our discussion above of P2, the lack of evidence in that premise resulted in that the argument failed. So the argument as a whole is unsound, and can therefore technically be dismissed.

Consequently, there is little to say about the conclusion here in P3. It certainly doesn’t follow, since P2 has not been found true.

Of course, it is not impossible that this argument could be updated in the future by Farber, thus supplying evidence for P2. But as it stands, there is no conclusion at all, for the argument as a whole is unsound.

PART 3: REFORMULATIONS

To help Farber (and others) to see more clearly what the options are, and what kind of latitude there is for discrediting the Law of Attraction, I am here proposing a better structure of Argument 1.

So my idea here is that Argument 1 should be split up into two separate arguments: Argument 1A and Argument 1B. When doing so one might more easily see what one’s options are.

And then, after some analysis, we can do some reformulations of Argument 1B to fix it up further, so that we can finally can arrive at Argument 1C (better) and Argument 1D (best).

So let us start with the easiest one first (Argument 1A), and then thereafter continue with the others, which all need more explanation.

Argument 1A: For Authorized Accounts

Here is how we can transform Argument 1 into Argument 1A, which deals exclusively with the authorized accounts of the Law of Attraction:

P1.Some authors of the authorized versions of the Law of Attraction say that it is based on scientific theory. (FALSE)

P2.But as we can see in the examples, many authors of the authorized versions of the Law of Attraction make obviously non-scientific claims. (FALSE)

P3.So the authorized versions of Law of Attraction are all metaphysical pseudoscience. (FALSE)

In Argument 1A there is approximately zero latitude to arrive at any discrediting of the authorized versions of the Law of Attraction. So that is a no-go. In other words, Argument 1A seems more or less impossible to adjust or convert into something else that would do the job.

Consequently, the best version to focus on, for anyone who feels an urge to discredit the Law of Attraction, would be Argument 1B (below), which then, after some adjustments (Argument 1C and Argument 1D), might work to some degree to discredit some of the more amateurish non-authorized versions of the Law of Attraction.

But even then, such an argument would not, of course, conclusively establish that the Law of Attraction is not true, or could not be true. So it would still be of questionable value.

Argument 1B: For Non-Authorized Accounts (1)

First note that the “≈TRUE” values that I have used below simply indicate that there is some potential in argument 1B that may be exploited, if one were to modify this argument so that it becomes better. But as it stands it is not very good.

P1.Some authors of the non-authorized versions of the Law of Attraction say that it is based on scientific theory. (≈TRUE)

P2.But as we can see in the examples, many authors of the non-authorized versions of the Law of Attraction make obviously non-scientific claims. (≈TRUE)

P3.So the non-authorized versions of Law of Attraction are all metaphysical pseudoscience. (≈TRUE)

Here I am assuming that Farber can prove all of his ten examples of non-scientific claims. Then it might be possible for him to have a reasonably valid and sound argument that would be able to almost conclude that which is expressed in P3 above.

I say “almost”, because P3 is too strong. Why? Because if only some of the non-authorized accounts are claiming that their versions are built on scientific theory (P1), then it does not follow from this argument that all non-authorized accounts are metaphysical pseudoscience. Of course, it may follow from some other argument that that is the case. But then that other argument would have to be formulated separately, with substantiating evidence, just like any sound argument would.

Another problem with this argument (and with the original Argument 1 as well) is that there is no “synching” of the persons mentioned in P1 and P2. So it may turn out that all of those who are claiming that their particular version of Law of Attraction is built on scientific theory (P1) actually are NOT making any non-scientific claims at all. If so, then P2 would be false, and therefore the conclusion (P3) would also be false.

Similarly, it may turn out that all of those who are making non-scientific claims (P2) actually are NOT among those who claim that their version of Law of Attraction is a scientific one. If so, then P1 is false, and the conclusion (P3) would also automatically be false.

So to fix that, then one would have to make sure, in one’s reformulation of P1 and P2, that it is the same person or persons that are referred to in both of those propositions. So if we say “some authors” in P1, then we must say “those same authors” in P2.

Thus, the only authors that are affected by this argument are those who are proponents of their own non-authorized version of the Law of Attraction, and who are both claiming that their account is scientific, while at the same time also are making non-scientific claims.

And even if Farber might find some authors who would fit the bill, that wouldn’t prove much. For being non-scientific or practicing pseudoscience is not necessarily an indication that their respective versions of Law of Attraction is not true.

Argument 1C: For Non-Authorized Accounts (2)

First note that the “≈TRUE” value that is left in the conclusion of Argument 1C merely indicates that there is some potential that may be exploited, if one were to modify P3, so that it becomes better. But as it stands it is not very good, although the overall quality is definitely better than Argument 1B.

P1.Some authors of the non-authorized versions of the Law of Attraction say that it is based on scientific theory. (TRUE)

P2.But as we can see in the examples, those very same authors of the non-authorized versions of the Law of Attraction make obviously non-scientific claims. (TRUE)

P3.So those non-authorized versions of Law of Attraction that are written by those very same authors are all metaphysical pseudoscience. (≈TRUE)

So the changes I have done here are the following. First, because of the “synching” problem found in Argument 1B, I have changed the wording of P2 and P3.

In P2 I changed the previous phrase “many authors” to “those very same authors”. This then has the effect that those “some authors” that are talked about in P1 are the very same authors that are mentioned in P2. So P1 and P2 are now “synched”.

But what about P3? Well, it is now also synched with P1 and P2. But it was a little tricky to arrive at a nice formulation that would work. In any case, I think the overall result is quite good, in terms of both the “synching” effect and the readability.

“Metaphysical Pseudoscience”

The question may now be raised:

“If we now here in Argument 1C have so successfully edited our propositions so that they are “synched”, why is this not already a good argument? Why are we still having this “≈TRUE” value left in the conclusion (P3)?”

My response is this. Although the overall quality of Argument 1C is quite good, the conclusion still doesn’t really work. Why? Because in P3 the phrase “metaphysical pseudoscience” suddenly jumps out of nowhere.

One may, of course, adopt a more lenient policy if one wants and allow it, since the argument doesn’t really accomplish much anyway. But since I think the issue is interesting, let us be more strict.

So the most “clean” way to do it, I think, would be to make three adjustments. The first adjustment is to keep the conclusion (P3) but move it down two steps, in order to prepare for two new propositions. So the overall conclusion is intact, but it is now labeled P5 instead of P3.

The second adjustment is to add a new intermediary conclusion (the new P3) that concludes something about “scientific theory” and “non-scientific claims” or some such thing that is relevant to those terms (and metaphysical pseudoscience is, as I said, too big of a jump to be used here).

The third adjustment is to add a new premise (P4) which specifies exactly how the transition between P3 and P5 should be bridged. So now let us take a look at my final attempt.

Argument 1D: For Non-Authorized Accounts (3)

Note that there are still “≈TRUE” values in this argument. But also note that P1, P2, and P3 are all good.

P1.Some authors of the non-authorized versions of the Law of Attraction say that it is based on scientific theory. (TRUE)

P2.But as we can see in the examples, those very same authors of the non-authorized versions of the Law of Attraction make obviously non-scientific claims. (TRUE)

P3.So those non-authorized versions of Law of Attraction that are written by those very same authors are all internally inconsistent. (TRUE)

P4.All accounts that are internally inconsistent must be labeled metaphysical pseudoscience. (≈TRUE)

P5.So those non-authorized versions of Law of Attraction that are written by those very same authors are all metaphysical pseudoscience. (≈TRUE)

So the result here is not very impressive, actually. P1, P2, and P3 seem to be relatively unproblematic. So if one is satisfied with those three, then one has a quite good argument.

But of course, many people who are mainstream scientists (or for some other reason wish to “protect themselves” against unwanted theories) would not be satisfied just by pointing out some “contradiction” or “inconsistency” here and there. They are typically more ambitious than that. What they so often want to conclude is that some theory or other is “metaphysical nonsense” or “pseudoscience”, etc.

But in order to be able to create such an argument there are various obstacles. In our current example, our newly created P4 seems to be problematic. For if it is true that just a simple contradiction or internal inconsistency invalidates a theory or set of theories, then half of the scientific enterprise would be in danger. I mean, how can anyone accept quantum mechanics at the same time as Newtonian mechanics? Are electrons particles, or are they not?

So P4 and P5, then, are problematic. But perhaps the inventive reader might come up with some good idea to bridge the gap between P3 and P5 in a nice and smooth way? If so, you are most welcome to comment below.

PART 4: OTHER OBSERVATIONS

In this part I am adding a few observations about the kind of words that Farber is using. Although his intention most probably is to discredit the Law of Attraction, some of the terms he is using may not necessarily be as “unpalatable” as he originally may have thought.

Metaphysics (1)

In his original argument Farber uses the phrase “metaphysical pseudoscience”. So let’s start with the word “metaphysical”. What does that mean? And why does he use that?

Well, my guess is that Farber thinks that it is a good word to use to communicate that something is “non-scientific”. Of course, he also uses the word “pseudoscience” in the same phrase, which means that there probably is more to it than that. So if he had wanted only to convey “non-scientific”, it might have sufficed to just use “pseudoscientific”.

Thus, there is probably more to it than that. One possibility is that he wants to communicate the idea that Law of Attraction is just as nonsensical as the idea of spiritualism, with all their seances and apparitions and mediums, etc. Or maybe he wants to indicate that a belief in the Law of Attraction is just as foolish as a belief in “heaven” and “God” and other such non-material ideas.

And perhaps the desired effect is that the reader should infer that the word “metaphysical” is to be understood as “irrational”, or some such thing. For if it’s irrational, then it is, by extension, also unscientific. So perhaps it’s one of those Dawkins-inspired moves? [notes 2 and 3]

Figure 1. Back cover of ‘The God Delusion’ by Richard Dawkins, with the information that Dawkins supports the idea that faith in God translates to irrationality.

But of course, the argument that a belief in God is irrational is, in my view, a really bad one. To arrive at such a conclusion in a deductively valid argument you would to have set it up something like this:

P1.God does not exist.

P2.It is irrational to believe in something that does not exist.

P3.It is irrational to believe in God.

So then the problem, of course, is that P1 is not proven. This means that, although the argument is valid (it’s “form” is technically accepted), it is not sound, because one of its premises is not shown to be true. So there is no conclusion to make, from this argument.

Since it is not proven that God does not exist, one cannot conclude that it is irrational to believe in God (using the argument above). If someone tried to conclude it anyway (using the argument above), THAT would be irrational, and non-scientific.

Metaphysics (2)

In any case, whatever Farber’s intention is, using the word “metaphysics” may not necessarily have the effect that he wants. For many scientists are also religious people or have a general spiritual sensibility. And some of these brilliant scientists can surely smell a rat a thousand miles away.

So instead of making the arguments more appealing to those readers, Farber may find that it sometimes may backfire, especially if the argument also is bad (which it is, in the case of his original Argument 1 above).

But we should also note, of course, that some scientists are more “compatible” with transcendental ideas than others. As John Polkinghorne notes (1998, p. 11):

“Physical scientists, conscious of the wonderful order and finely tuned fruitfulness of natural law, have shown significant sympathy with the attitude of the new natural theology. Biological scientists, on the other hand, have been much more reserved.”

Thus, if Polkinghorne is correct, then one might expect that biologists would be more prone to read the word “metaphysics” as a substitute for “nonsense” or “irrational”, but that physical scientists typically may be less prone to do that, or not do that at all. [note 4]

Another group of potential readers are those academic philosophers who have metaphysics as their specialty. For metaphysics is one of the many fields within modern philosophy.

If we use the distinction that Kant once introduced, namely between transcendent metaphysics and critical metaphysics (Loux 1998, p. 8), we can say that the former deals with “transcendental” questions such as God and angels (also found in philosophy of religion), while the latter more or less deals with ideas such as categories, universals, propositions, possible worlds, etc. [notes 5 and 6]

So some such academic philosophers, whether working in transcendent metaphysics or in critical metaphysics may not be very pleased by this usage. Or perhaps they are simply amused, since the word “metaphysics” actually could imply being very fundamental and very important (as they may perceive it to be in their own work). Thus, using “metaphysical” in Argument 1 might not work as intended.

Pseudoscience

What about “pseudoscience”? Why that term? Well the reason is most probably just to say: “Whatever the Law of Attraction is, it’s not science”. Perhaps the intention is to indicate that it is not scientific in the sense that it will never be taken seriously in academia. Or perhaps the intention is to give the impression that it is just nonsense or plain rubbish, and that it never can be classified as “knowledge”, or have any other positive qualities.

In any case, Law of Attraction is in good company though. For other theories by well-respected scientists and thinkers have also been labeled as pseudoscience. Here’s what Rosenberg tells us about how some of the twentieth-century logical empiricists evaluated some theories (2000, p. 85):

“Marx’s dialectical materialism, and Freud’s psychodynamic theory were stigmatized as pseudo-science, because their explanatory concepts — surplus value, the oedipal complex, etc. — could not be given empirical meaning”

Rosenberg continues on that same page:

“But it was not just pseudo-science which these empiricist philosophers attacked. As we have seen even such indispensable terms as ‘gravity’ were subject to criticism for lack of ’empirical content’. Some logical positivists, and the later nineteenth-century physicists who influenced them, also denied the meaningfulness of concepts such as ‘molecule’ and ‘atom’.”

And also other theories have been claimed to be pseudo-science (Shermer 2006, p. 670):

“The theory of evolution, for example, has been accused by creationists as being nonscientific because no one was there to see it happen and biologists cannot observe it in the laboratory because it takes too long. But, in fact, by Popper’s criterion of falsifiability, the theory of evolution would be doomed to the trash heap of bad science if, say, human fossil remains turned up in the same geological bedding planes as 300-million-year-old trilobites.”

Well, I think Shermer’s wrong. Although Popper’s falsifiability criterion, theoretically speaking, very well could be applied to Darwin’s thesis, it would be unimaginable to believe that anyone in the scientific community would ever allow it, even if some ancient artifact like that would be unearthed.

And even if the scientists perhaps eventually would decide to report such a find, there are of course thousands of ways to explain it away without dismissing their hero Darwin’s theories [whose theories, by the way, are false, as noted in Seth on Darwinian evolution]. For we do know, from the history and sociology of science, that old scientific paradigms die hard (Kuhn 1996, p. 5):

“Normal science, for example, often suppresses fundamental novelties because they are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments.”

The important thing to note here is that there really isn’t any strict definition of “science” or “scientific method” that easily separates “bad theories” from “good theories” or “true theories” from “false theories”. For those who have done their homework and studied the philosophy of science, that should be no news.

So to sum up: what is pseudoscience? One way to describe it is this: “It’s that which the scientists don’t want to count as science”.

CONCLUSION

The “metaphysical pseudoscience” argument by Farber is not very potent in its original form (Argument 1). Since there is no evidence to support P2 in Argument 1, it is unsound and inconsequential.

And the other reformulations that I have provided above are also problematic in various ways. And Argument 1A, in particular, has zero power to discredit the authorized versions of the Law of Attraction.

In other words, Farber has not proven anything substantial about the Law of Attraction itself, and certainly not that it is false. So the Law of Attraction can still be 100% true.

Chris Bocay

NOTES

  1. So instead of the usual formula F = Gm1m2/r2 they might have used F = GT2m1m2/r3 (and where T is a new variable) or any similar modification of the established formula. Cf. Guinn 2004, p. 1866.
  2. As seen in the figure above, the text on the back cover of Richard Dawkins’s The God Delusion clearly states Dawkins’s commitment to the idea that faith in God is irrational (Dawkins 2006).
  3. See, for example, the section called “Faith is irrational” in Alister McGrath’s The Dawkins Delusion, p. 5. Also note professor Michael Ruse’s (Florida State University) comment on the cover: “The God Delusion makes me embarrassed to be an atheist, and the McGraths show me why.”
  4. One exception to Polkinghorne’s principle that biologists are less interested in transcendental matters is the female scientist that is interviewed in Faith in Science (Richardson and Slack 2001). Pauline Rudd, a University Reader in Glycobiology at the University of Oxford says: “When I experience molecules, it is a lot like how I experience God” (Richardson and Slack 2001, p. 87).
  5. There is a very nice diagram of the different areas of study within the field of metaphysics in Ted Honderich, ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995, p. 934).
  6. Another way of subdividing the field of metaphysics can be found in Richard De George’s Classical and Contemporary Metaphysics (1962). This source book has five parts: 1. The Nature and Function of Metaphysics; 2. Reality: Realism versus Idealism; 3. Being and Substance; 4. Mind, Body, and the Person; 5. The World, Emergence, and God.

REFERENCES

  • Dawkins, Richard (2006), The God Delusion. London: Bantam Press. [Link to book]
  • De George, Richard T., ed. (1962), Classical and Contemporary Metaphysics: A Source Book. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. [Link to book]
  • Guinn, Jim (2004) “Gravity and Gravitation” in K. Lee Lerner and Brenda Wilmoth Lerner, eds., The Gale Encyclopedia of Science. Third Edition. Volume 3: Factor – Kuru. Farmington Hills, MI: The Gale Group. [Link to book]
  • Honderich, Ted, ed. (1995), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. [Link to book]
  • Kuhn, Thomas S. (1996), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Third Edition. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. [Link to book]
  • Loux, Michael J. (1998), Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. London: Routledge. [Link to book]
  • McGrath, Alister, and Joanna Collicutt McGrath (2007), The Dawkins Delusion? Atheist Fundamentalism and the Denial of the Divine. London: SPCK. [Link to book]
  • Polkinghorne, John (1998), Belief in God in an Age of Science. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. [Link to book]
  • Richardson, W. Mark, and Gordy Slack (2001), Faith in Science: Scientists Search for Truth. London and New York: Routledge. [Link to book]
  • Rosenberg, Alex (2000), Philosophy of Science. London and New York: Routledge. [Link to book]
  • Shermer, Michael (2006), “Science and Pseudoscience” in Donald M. Borchert, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Volume 8: Price – Sextus Empiricus. Second edition. Farmington Hills, MI: Thomson Gale (Macmillan Reference USA). [Link to book]

Copyright © 2022 by Chris Bocay. All rights reserved.

First published: Sun 4 Sep 2022
Last revised: Fri 9 Sep 2022

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